Measuring the speed of the conscious components of recognition memory: Remembering is faster than knowing. by Dewhurst, Stephen A. et al.
1 
Measuring the speed of the conscious components of recognition memory: 




Stephen A. Dewhurst, Selina J. Holmes, Karen R. Brandt 
Department of Psychology, Lancaster University 
 
Graham M. Dean 





Please address correspondence to: 
Stephen A. Dewhurst 
Department of Psychology 
Lancaster University 
Lancaster LA1 4YF 
England 
Tel: 44 (0)1524 593835 
Fax: 44 (0)1524 593744 
Email: s.a.dewhurst@lancaster.ac.uk 
2 
Three experiments investigated response times (RTs) for remember and know 
responses in recognition memory. RTs to remember responses were faster than 
RTs to know responses, regardless of whether the remember/know decision 
was preceded by an old/new decision (two-step procedure) or was made 
without a preceding old/new decision (one-step procedure). The finding of 
faster RTs for R responses was also found when remember/know decisions 
were made retrospectively. These findings are inconsistent with dual-process 
models of recognition memory, which predict that recollection is slower and 
more effortful than familiarity. Word frequency did not influence RTs, but 
remember responses were faster for words than for nonwords. We argue that 
the difference in RTs to remember and know responses reflects the time taken 
to make old/new decisions on the basis of the type of information activated at 
test.  
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 According to dual-process models of recognition memory, previously 
studied items can be identified as old either because they are consciously 
recollected or because they evoke a feeling of familiarity (e.g., Atkinson & 
Juola, 1974; Jacoby, 1991; Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Mandler, 1980, 1988; 
Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1996). This distinction is supported by findings from 
studies showing that recollection and familiarity can be dissociated 
experimentally. For example, recollection is more sensitive than familiarity to 
levels-of-processing manipulations (e.g., Gardiner, 1988; Khoe, Kroll, 
Yonelinas, Dobbins, & Knight, 2000; Mulligan & Hirshman, 1995) and 
divided attention (e.g., Gardiner & Parkin, 1990; Jacoby & Kelley, 1992; 
Jacoby, Woloshyn, & Kelley, 1989), while familiarity is more sensitive than 
recollection to modality changes between study and test (e.g., Gregg & 
Gardiner, 1994; Toth, 1996). There is also evidence that recollection and 
familiarity are supported by different brain regions. For example, findings 
from several studies indicate that recollection is dependent on the 
hippocampus while familiarity is dependent on the surrounding medial 
temporal lobe regions (e.g., Aggleton & Brown, 1999; Tulving & 
Markowitsch, 1998; Yonelinas, Kroll, Dobbins, Lazzara, & Knight, 1998). 
Recollection and familiarity can thus can be dissociated both behaviorally and 
in terms of their underlying neural substrates (see Yonelinas, 2002, for a 
review).  
 The view that recognition memory involves two processes has also 
been investigated using the remember-know procedure (Gardiner, 1988; 
Tulving, 1985). This procedure capitalizes on the fact that recollection and 
familiarity can be distinguished on the basis of subjective experience. In 
remember-know studies, participants are instructed to categorize each positive 
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recognition decision as either a remember (R) response if they can consciously 
recollect the item’s study presentation, or a know (K) response if they 
recognize the item on the basis of familiarity but cannot consciously recollect 
its study presentation. The distinction between remembering and knowing was 
originally used to describe the states of awareness that characterize retrieval 
from episodic and semantic memory respectively (Tulving, 1985). However, 
subsequent findings have often been interpreted within a dual-process 
framework (e.g., Dewhurst & Anderson, 1999; Dewhurst & Hitch, 1999; 
Jacoby, Yonelinas, & Jennings, 1997; Rajaram, 1993, 1996; Yonelinas, 2002).  
 Although the distinction between remembering and knowing is 
consistent with the view that recognition memory involves two separate 
processes, some studies that have used the remember-know procedure have 
produced findings that are inconsistent with the predictions of dual-process 
models. For example, dual-process models attribute the word frequency effect 
(WFE) in recognition memory (better recognition of low-frequency than high-
frequency words) to a greater enhancement of familiarity for the low-
frequency words following their study presentation (e.g., Jacoby & Dallas, 
1981; Mandler, 1980). However, Gardiner and Java (1990) found a WFE in R 
rather than K responses, suggesting that word frequency influences 
recollection rather than familiarity (see Dewhurst, Hitch, & Barry, 1998, for 
similar findings). This is consistent with the view that the WFE reflects the 
greater distinctiveness of low-frequency words (Glanzer & Adams, 1990; 
Rajaram, 1996; Reder, Nhouyvanisvong, Schunn, Ayers, Angstadt, & Hikari, 
2000). 
 The aim of the present study was to investigate a further discrepancy 
between dual-process models and remember-know studies concerning the 
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relative speed of the recollection and familiarity processes. According to dual-
process models, familiarity is a rapid and automatic process that places 
relatively low demands on cognitive resources, whereas recollection is a 
slower and more effortful process that places greater demands on cognitive 
resources (e.g., Atkinson & Juola, 1974; Jacoby, 1991; Mandler, 1980, 1988; 
Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1994, 1996). This view is supported by the findings of 
Hintzman and Caulton (1997) that under speeded test conditions participants 
can make old/new decisions more rapidly than they can make judgements that 
require recollection of the learning episode. Further support for this position is 
provided by the findings of Boldini, Russo, and Avons (2004) who used a 
speed-accuracy trade-off procedure to separate the recollection and familiarity 
processes. They found that modality matches (assumed to influence 
familiarity) enhanced recognition with early response deadlines, while deep 
processing (assumed to influence recollection) enhanced recognition with late 
response deadlines. However, findings from remember-know investigations 
are inconsistent with the view that familiarity is faster then recollection. For 
example, Gardiner, Ramponi, and Richardson-Klavehn (1999) found that R 
responses can be made as rapidly as K responses under speeded test 
conditions. Participants in this study were trained to make old/new decisions 
within an early (500 msec) or late (1500 msec) response deadline, before 
making R/K decisions for items judged as old. Gardiner et al. found effects of 
levels-of-processing and generation in R responses at both early and late 
response deadlines and concluded that R as well as K responses can be 
triggered automatically. More recently, Konstantinou and Gardiner (in press) 
extended the response deadline procedure to face recognition and again found 
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effects of levels-of-processing in R responses with both early and late 
response deadlines.  
 Further evidence that recollection can be triggered automatically 
comes from response time (RT) studies showing that R responses are made 
more rapidly than K responses. For example, Dewhurst and Conway (1994) 
instructed participants to make old/new decisions followed by R/K decisions 
to items judged as old. They found that old judgements were made more 
rapidly to items that were subsequently categorized as R responses rather than 
K responses (see Dewhurst et al., 1998, for similar findings). Dewhurst and 
Conway argued that R responses have an all-or-none quality while K 
responses have to undergo post-retrieval processing in order to determine their 
familiarity relative to other items in the test list. Similar findings were reported 
by Henson, Rugg, Shallice, Josephs, and Dolan (1999) who instructed 
participants to make R, K, or new (N) judgements to test items. They found 
that both R and N judgements were associated with faster RTs than K 
judgements. Henson et al. suggested that the slower RTs for K responses 
reflect the difficulty of making old judgements without the recollection of 
contextual details, and that such decisions are particularly effortful when test 
items evoke a degree of familiarity that falls on the K/N threshold. 
 In his review of dual-process models, Yonelinas (2002) argued that the 
slower RTs for K responses are an artefact of instructions that ask participants 
to make a K response only if an item is not recollected. He suggested that such 
instructions encourage participants to wait until both processes are completed 
before making their decision. If the slower RTs for K responses are merely 
due to demand characteristics, then the findings have little empirical or 
theoretical value. However, if the RTs reflect genuine differences in the speed 
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of the underlying processes, then they have clear implications for models of 
recognition memory.  
 The present study investigated the relative speed of remembering and 
knowing by measuring RTs in a series of variations on the remember-know 
procedure. Experiments 1 and 3 used the procedure introduced by Dewhurst 
and Conway (1994) in which participants made a timed old/new followed by 
an untimed R/K decision for each item before proceeding to the next item. 
Positive recognition decisions were divided into R and K responses and RTs 
to the old/new decision were compared. This is what Eldridge, Sarfatti, and 
Knowlton (2002) have referred to as a two-step procedure, whereby 
participants make separate old/new and R/K decisions before moving on to the 
next item. Experiment 1 also included a one-step condition (Eldridge et al., 
2002) in which participants made a timed R/K decision without a preceding 
old/new decision. Experiment 2 attempted to decouple the R/K decision from 
the old/new decision by instructing participants to make old/new decisions to 
the full set of test items before seeing them a second time and making R/K 
judgements for each item previously judged as old. 
 Experiments 1 and 2 also included a word frequency manipulation. As 
noted above, the presence of the WFE in R responses is counter to the 
predictions of dual-process models, which attribute the recognition advantage 
for low-frequency words to a greater enhancement of familiarity following 
their study presentation (Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Mandler, 1980). However, it 
is possible that the presence of the WFE in R responses is an artefact of the 
two-step remember-know procedure in which decisions of subjective 
experience are made only after a speeded old/new decision has been made. If 
familiarity is faster than recollection, it is possible that old/new decisions are 
8 
based on familiarity and that items initially recognized on that basis are 
subsequently categorized as R responses when the slower recollection process 
has been completed. Comparison of the one-step and two-step procedures 
allowed us to investigate this possibility. The presence of the WFE in R 
responses was also taken to indicate the consistent use of R and K response 
categories in the different test conditions. In previous RT investigations, 
variables that influenced hit rates in R and K responses did not affect RTs 
(Dewhurst & Conway, 1994; Dewhurst et al., 1998). This may also be an 
artefact of the two-step procedure. We therefore included word frequency as 
an independent variable in the analysis of RTs. The exception to this was 
Experiment 3, which used a words-versus-nonwords manipulation. The 
rationale for this is explained in the introduction to Experiment 3.  
Experiment 1 
 The aims of Experiment 1 were (i) to confirm previous findings that 
old/new decisions are faster for items subsequently categorized as R responses 
than for items subsequently categorized as K responses and (ii) to test whether 
this finding is an artefact of the two-step remember-know procedure. One 
group of participants followed the two-step procedure used by Dewhurst and 
Conway (1994). In the analysis of RTs, hits were divided into R and K 
responses on the basis of the second response and RTs to the old/new decision 
were compared. A second group of participants followed the one-step 
procedure whereby they made R/K decisions without a preceding old/new 
decision. Eldridge et al. suggested that the one-step procedure leads 
participants to adopt a more liberal response criterion. However, in their 
second experiment they found that giving participants a guess response option 
in addition to R and K enabled participants to make responses that were not 
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based simply on trace strength (see also Gardiner, Java, & Richardson-
Klavehn, 1996). We therefore included a guess (G) option in addition to R and 
K.  
 Hicks and Marsh (1999) found that the one-step procedure introduced 
a liberal response bias whereby correct and false R and K responses increased 
relative to the two-step procedure. They suggested that a single R/K/N 
decision is the more difficult procedure as it requires participants to choose 
between three options. The two-step procedure involves only binary decisions 
and is therefore the easier of the two. We therefore expected RTs to the R/K 
decision in the one-step procedure to be slower than RTs to the yes/no 
decision in the two-step procedure. The effects of word frequency in hits, false 
alarms, and RTs were also investigated.  
Method 
 Participants. Fifty six undergraduate volunteers from Lancaster 
University took part in Experiment 1. All were native English speakers. They 
were tested at individual work stations in groups of between five and eight and 
were paid for their participation.  
 Stimuli and Design. Stimuli consisted of 40 high-frequency words and 
40 low-frequency words selected from Kucera and Francis (1967). The high-
frequency words had a frequency count of at least 100 occurrences per million 
and the low-frequency words had a count of less than 10 per million. The 
words were divided into two lists, each comprising 20 high-frequency and 20 
low-frequency words. One list was presented to participants at encoding and 
presented as targets in the recognition test. The other was used for lure items 
in the recognition test. Half the participants studied list 1 and the remainder 
studied list 2. Study items were presented in a different random order for each 
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participant. The order of test items was also randomized separately for each 
participant. The dependent measures were the number of R, K, and G 
responses given in the recognition test and their respective response times.  
 Procedure. Study items were presented one at a time on Apple 
Macintosh computers. Each word remained on the screen for 1 second with an 
intertrial interval of 1.5 seconds. Participants were instructed to read the words 
silently in preparation for a memory test, the nature of which was not 
specified. After all the words had been presented, participants were engaged in 
a nonverbal distractor task (solving arithmetic problems) for 10 minutes and 
were then given the instructions for the recognition test. Participants were 
informed that they were about to see another sequence of words, some of 
which had appeared in the previous set. Their task was to identify the words 
that appeared in the earlier set by pressing the appropriate response key on the 
numberpad on the right hand side of the keyboard. Participants then received 
instructions for R, K, and G responses (taken from Dewhurst & Anderson, 
1999). Briefly, they were told to make an R response if they could consciously 
recollect seeing an item in the study list and could recall contextual details 
such as associations or images generated at the time. They were told to make a 
K response if a word felt familiar from the study list but they could not 
recollect any details of its previous occurrence. They were told to make a G 
response if they were unable to decide if a word had appeared or not. 
 Participants in the two-step condition were instructed to press 1 for an 
old item and 2 for a new item. They were told that if they made a positive 
decision, a prompt would appear on the screen asking them to press R for 
remember, K for know, or G for guess. The words and the R/K/G prompt 
remained on the screen until a keypress was made. The R/K/G prompt 
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appeared 500 ms. after the old/new response, and trials were separated by a 2 
second interval. Participants were instructed to make the old/new decision as 
quickly and as accurately as possible but to take as long as they needed for the 
remember/know decision.  
 The one-step condition featured a go / no go procedure. Participants in 
this group were instructed to press the 1 key if they could recollect seeing an 
item in the study list (remember response) or the 2 key if the item felt familiar 
from the study list (know response). This pattern was reversed for half the 
participants. Participants were instructed to press the space bar with their left 
hand if their response was a guess. They were asked to make the R/K decision 
as quickly and as accurately as possible. They were told not to make a 
response if they did not recognize the item, in which case it would be removed 
from the screen after five seconds. Items remained on the screen for five 
seconds or until a response key was pressed. Test items were separated by a 
two second interval.   
Results and Discussion 
 Table 1 shows the mean RTs and mean proportions of correct and false 
R, K, and G responses. Note that RTs for the two-step condition represent the 
mean latencies for “old” judgements divided into R and K responses on the 
basis of the untimed R/K decision, while RTs in the one-step procedure 
represent mean latencies for R and K responses without a preceding old/new 
decision. Alpha was set at .05 in all statistical analyses. Guess responses were 
not included in the analyses as they were produced by only a subset of 
participants and are typically made below chance levels (Gardiner, Ramponi, 
& Richardson-Klavehn, 2002). However, their proportions and RTs are 
included in the tables for comparison with R and K responses. Prior to their 
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statistical analysis, the RTs from all participants were collated and outliers 
(RTs greater than 2.5 standard deviations from the mean) were identified. 
Outliers were calculated separately for R, K, and G responses and removed 
from the individual data files. A total of 22 outliers were removed from the 
two-step condition (11 R, 9 K, and 2 G responses) and 25 from the one-step 
condition (15 R and 10 K). These represented less than 5% of the total number 
of responses.  
Please insert Table 1 about here 
 A preliminary analysis of RTs consisted of a 2x2x2 (Group x 
Frequency x Response Type) mixed Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) 
conducted on data from participants who made correct responses in each of 
the four cells created by crossing Frequency (high versus low) and Response 
Type (R versus K). This confined the analysis to 45 of the 56 participants (23 
in the two-step procedure and 22 in the one-step procedure). Frequency did 
not significantly influence RTs and did not interact with Response Type, F < 1 
in both cases. For the two-step condition, the mean RTs for R responses (in 
ms) were 995 for high-frequency and 1029 for low-frequency, while the mean 
RTs for K responses were 1300 for high-frequency and 1254 for low-
frequency. In the one-step condition, mean RTs for R responses were 1221 for 
high-frequency and 1177 for low-frequency, while the mean RTs for K 
responses were 1672 for high-frequency and 1796 for low-frequency.  
The RT data were therefore collapsed across Frequency and entered 
into a 2x2 mixed ANOVA with Group (one-step versus two-step) as a 
between-groups factor and Response Type (R versus K) treated as a within 
factor. One participant in the one-step condition did not make any correct K 
responses, therefore the data from that participant were omitted from the 
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analysis of RTs. The ANOVA showed that R responses overall were reliably 
faster than K responses, F (1,53) = 38.40, MSE = 84029.07. In addition, RTs 
in the two-step condition were reliably faster than RTs in the one-step 
condition, F (1,53) = 15.95, MSE = 169921.19. Group also interacted with 
Response Type, F (1,53) = 7.76, MSE = 84025.25. Analysis of simple main 
effects showed that the increase in RTs with the one-step procedure was 
present in K responses, F (1,106) = 23.71, MSE = 126975.13, but not in R 
responses, F (1,106) = 2.77, MSE = 126975.13, p = .10.  
 The numbers of correct R and K responses were entered into a 2x2x2 
(Group x Frequency x Response Type) ANOVA. The main effect of Group 
was not significant, F < 1. The main effect of Response Type was significant, 
with participants making more R than K responses overall, F (1,54) = 5.91, 
MSE = 42.11. A significant main effect of Frequency was also observed, 
whereby overall recognition was greater for low-frequency words than for 
high-frequency words, F (1,54) = 9.79, MSE = 2.64. These effects were 
qualified by a significant interaction between Frequency and Response Type, 
F (1,54) = 20.98, MSE = 10.87. Analysis of simple main effects showed a 
significant advantage for low-frequency words in R responses, F (1,108) = 
30.15, MSE = 6.75, and a significant advantage for high-frequency words in K 
responses, F (1,108) = 7.44, MSE = 6.75. A similar analysis of false alarms 
showed that they were greater for high-frequency than for low-frequency 
words, F (1,54) = 26.98, MSE = 1.53, and were more likely to be categorized 
as K than as R responses, F (1,54) = 42.87, MSE = 4.68. None of the 
interactions reached statistical significance.  
 The findings from Experiment 1 are consistent with previous findings 
reported by Dewhurst and Conway (1994) and Dewhurst et al. (1998). Positive 
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recognition decisions were reliably faster when items were categorized as R 
responses rather than K responses. These findings are inconsistent with the 
view that familiarity is a rapid and automatic process and recollection is 
slower and more effortful. Instead, the findings suggest that old decisions 
based on recollection can occur rapidly and automatically, while decisions 
based on familiarity require additional processes, possibly in order to 
determine their familiarity relative to other items in the test. The results of the 
one-step condition indicate that these findings are not an artefact of the two-
step remember-know procedure. Even without a preceding old/new decision, 
R responses were executed reliably faster than K responses. These findings are 
again consistent with the view the R responses can be made rapidly and 
automatically in an all-or-none manner. The finding that RTs are slower in the 
one-step procedure relative to the two-step procedure is consistent with the 
suggestion of Hicks and Marsh (1999) that the one-step procedure is the more 
difficult of the two, as it requires a decision between three alternatives (R, K, 
and new) rather than successive binary decisions. The finding that this effect 
was reliably present only in K responses provides further support for the all-
or-none nature of recollective experience. 
 Analysis of the numbers of hits showed a WFE in R responses, with 
participants making more R responses to low-frequency than to high-
frequency words. This is consistent with findings reported previously by 
Gardiner and Java (1990) and by Dewhurst et al. (1998). A mirror effect was 
also observed, in that the effect of frequency in false alarms was in the 
opposite direction to the effect observed in hits. This is also consistent with 
previous findings (e.g., Glanzer & Adams, 1985, 1990).  
Experiment 2 
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 The aim of Experiment 2 was to test the view that the difference in 
RTs between R and K responses reflects demand characteristics, whereby 
participants delay making a K response until both processes are completed 
(Yonelinas, 2002). This was investigated by presenting test items twice and 
decoupling the R/K decision from the old/new decision. On the first 
presentation, participants made old/new decisions for the full set of test items. 
The items were then presented again and participants were asked to indicate 
whether their previous old/new decisions had been based on recollection or on 
familiarity. Any differences in RTs to old/new decisions between items 
subsequently categorized as R or as K responses should reflect genuine 
differences in the speed of the decision, rather than a strategy that prioritizes R 
responses.  
Method 
 The Method was the same as the two-step condition of Experiment 1 
with the following modifications: A new group of 50 undergraduates took 
part, none of whom had taken part in the previous experiments. The 
recognition test was divided into two stages. In the first stage, participants 
were asked to press the 1 key if they recognized a word from the study list and 
the 2 key if they did not. Speed and accuracy of response were again 
emphasized. In the second stage, the recognition list was presented again, in a 
different random order, and participants were asked to recall the basis on 
which they had made each positive decision in the first stage. They were asked 
to press R if their previous recognition decision had been based on 
recollection, K if it had been based on familiarity, G if they had made a guess, 
or 2 if they had not recognized the word. Participants were not reminded of the 
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responses they made at the first stage as it was feared this would artificially 
inflate the numbers of K responses.  
Results and Discussion 
 Following the procedure described for Experiment 1, 37 outliers were 
removed (23 R, 10 K, and 4 G), representing less than 5% of the total number 
of responses. Table 2 shows mean RTs and mean proportions of correct and 
false R, K, and G responses. Preliminary analysis of RTs on the 33 
participants who made responses in each cell showed neither a significant 
effect of Frequency nor a significant interaction between Frequency and 
Response Type, F < 1 in both cases. Mean RTs for R responses were 794 for 
high-frequency and 775 for low-frequency, while mean RTs for K responses 
were 839 for high-frequency and 868 for low-frequency. The RT data were 
therefore collapsed across Frequency and the analysis was expanded to the 45 
participants who made at least one correct R and one correct K response. The 
resulting data were analyzed in a related t-test which showed that RTs to the 
initial old/new decisions were reliably faster for items that were later 
categorized as R responses rather than K responses, t ( 44) = 2.13.  
Please insert Table 2 about here 
 In the analysis of hits, the main effect of Response Type was 
significant, F (1,49) = 47.07, MSE = 30.63, with participants making reliably 
more R than K responses. A significant main effect of Frequency was also 
observed, F (1,49) = 29.42, MSE = 3.01. Consistent with previous findings, 
participants correctly recognized more low-frequency than high-frequency 
words. This was qualified by a significant Frequency by Response Type 
interaction, F (1,49) = 23.33, MSE = 6.87. Analysis of simple main effects 
showed that the effect of Frequency was reliably present in R responses, F 
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(1,49) = 80.95, MSE = 3.01, but not in K responses, F (1,49) = 1.76, MSE = 
3.01. False alarms were greater for high-frequency than for low-frequency 
words, F (1,49) = 5.65, MSE = 1.21. Neither the effect of Response Type nor 
the interaction between Frequency and Response Type were significant in the 
false alarms, F < 1 in both cases).  
 The results of Experiment 2 provide strong evidence against a demand 
characteristics explanation of the faster RTs for R responses (Yonelinas, 
2002). Recognition decisions that were subsequently categorized as R 
responses were made more rapidly than decisions subsequently categorized as 
K responses, even though the R/K decision was decoupled from the old/new 
decision. Participants were not informed of the distinction between R and K 
responses when making their old/new decisions and therefore would not have 
adopted a strategy of waiting until both processes were complete before 
making their response.  
Experiment 3 
 Experiments 1 and 2 found no effects of word frequency in RTs. This 
is consistent with the null effects of frequency and age-of-acquisition in RTs 
reported by Dewhurst et al. (1998) and the null effects of pictures-versus-
words and imagery reported by Dewhurst and Conway (1994). Nevertheless, 
in each of these studies RTs to R responses were reliably faster than RTs to K 
responses. This suggests that any test item that cues episodic details will 
produce a rapid R response. The stimuli in Experiments 1 and 2 were 
exclusively words, and it is likely that words presented at study give rise to 
rich, episodic traces by activating long-term knowledge, regardless of their 
frequency. This knowledge is cued when the words are presented again at test 
and allows the participant to make rapid and confident R responses. 
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Experiment 3 therefore featured a words-versus-nonwords manipulation. 
Nonwords are unlikely to activate stored knowledge and will therefore be 
encoded less distinctively than words. The encoding of nonwords is more 
likely to feature phonological or orthographic details, which may be less 
diagnostic of a prior presentation and may result in slower RTs at test. 
Experiment 3 investigated this possibility.  
Method 
 The Method was the same as the two-step condition of Experiment 1 
with the following modifications: Participants were a new group of 40 
students from Lancaster University. Stimuli consisted of 60 words and 60 
nonwords, divided into two study lists of 30 words and 30 nonwords each. The 
words were selected from the Toronto Word Pool, Friendly, Franklin, 
Hoffman, & Rubin, 1982) and were of moderate to high frequency. Nonwords 
were selected from the ARC Nonword Database (Rastle, Harrington, & 
Coltheart, 2002) and were all pronounceable.  
Results and Discussion 
 Following the procedure used in Experiments 1 and 2, 49 outliers (29 
R, 16 K, and 4 G) were removed, again representing less than 5% of the total 
number of responses. Contrary to the effects of word frequency in 
Experiments 1 and 2, preliminary analyses indicated that RTs were influenced 
by the words-versus-nonwords manipulation. The main analysis of RTs was 
therefore conducted on the 34 participants who made responses in each of the 
four cells created by crossing Words-versus-nonwords and Response Type. 
Consistent with Experiments 1 and 2, a significant main effect of Response 
Type was observed, F (1,33) = 110.83, MSE = 96051.43, whereby RTs to R 
responses were faster than RTs to K responses. A significant main effect of 
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Words-versus-nonwords was also observed, F (1,33) = 6.20, MSE = 
148239.54, whereby RTs to words were faster than RTs to nonwords. This 
was qualified by a significant interaction between Response Type and Words-
versus-nonwords, F (1,33) = 9.65, MSE = 105418.89. Analysis of simple main 
effects showed that R responses to words were reliably faster than R responses 
to nonwords, F (1,33) = 13.05, MSE = 148239.54, whereas K responses to 
words and nonwords did not differ reliably, F < 1. R responses were faster 
than K responses for both words and nonwords, F = 94.98 and 26.44 
respectively, MSE = 96051.43. Table 3 shows the mean hit and false alarm 
rates collected from all 40 participants, plus the mean RTs from the subset of 
34 participants described above.  
Please insert Table 3 about here 
 A 2x2 ANOVA on the numbers of correct R and K responses showed 
that participants recognized more words than nonwords, F (1,39) = 7.46, MSE 
= 12.26, and made more R than K responses, F (1,39) = 17.86, MSE = 73.74. 
The interaction was also significant, F (1,39) = 26.68, MSE = 18.24. Analysis 
of simple main effects showed that more R responses were made to words 
than to nonwords, F (1,39) = 40.77, MSE = 12.26, while more K responses 
were made to nonwords than to words, F (1,39) = 6.36, MSE = 12.26. A 
similar analysis on the false alarms showed that these were more likely to be 
categorized as K than R responses, F (1,39) = 15.34, MSE = 7.87. The effect 
of Words-versus-nonwords and the interaction were not significant for the 
false alarms, F < 1 in both cases.  
 The main finding from Experiment 3 was that the manipulation of 
words-versus-nonwords significantly influenced RTs. This is in contrast to the 
findings of Experiments 1 and 2 and previous research (Dewhurst & Conway, 
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1994; Dewhurst et al., 1998) that stimulus characteristics do not influence 
RTs, despite having significant effects on hit rates. However, despite the 
difference between words and nonwords, R responses were faster than K 
responses for both types of stimuli. The finding that words were associated 
with more R responses and fewer K responses than nonwords is consistent 
with the findings of Gardiner and Java (1990). 
General Discussion 
 The results of three experiments confirm previous findings that R 
responses are made more rapidly than K responses (Dewhurst & Conway, 
1994; Dewhurst et al., 1998; Henson et al., 1999). These findings are 
inconsistent with the view that recollection is a slower and more effortful 
process than familiarity. According to dual-process models, recollection is a 
resource-demanding task that is mediated by consciousness (Jacoby & Dallas, 
1981) and requires the same effortful processes as those used in tests of recall 
(Mandler, 1980). The present findings show that recognition decisions based 
on recollection, at least as measured by R responses, can be made rapidly and 
accurately. In contrast, K responses require additional post-retrieval processes, 
possibly in order to determine their familiarity relative to other items in the 
test.  
 The present findings are also inconsistent with the suggestion by 
Yonelinas (2002) that the faster RTs for R responses are an artefact of 
instructions that require participants to make a K response only when an item 
is not recollected. He suggested that such instructions encourage participants 
to wait until both the recollection and the familiarity processes are completed 
before making a response. The results of Experiment 2, in particular, do not 
support this account. Participants in Experiment 2 made old/new decisions 
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more rapidly to items that were subsequently categorized as R responses, even 
when the R/K decision was decoupled from the old/new decision. Under such 
conditions, participants would not be aware that their recognition decisions 
could be based on two different processes. These findings therefore provide 
strong evidence against a demand characteristics account.  
 The finding that R responses are made more rapidly than K responses 
appears to be incompatible with previous findings that recognition decisions 
are faster when based on familiarity. For example, Boldini et al. (2004) found 
that effects of modality manipulations (presumed to influence familiarity) 
were observed with an early response deadline whereas a levels-of-processing 
manipulation (presumed to influence recollection) affected recognition only 
with a late response deadline. Similarly, Hintzman and Caulton (1997) found 
that old/new decisions were made more rapidly than decisions that required 
recollection of the learning episode. It is difficult to compare the findings of 
the present study with findings from response deadline studies as forcing 
participants to make speeded responses may alter the nature of the recognition 
decision. However, it is notable that Gardiner et al. found levels-of-processing 
effects in R responses with both early and late response deadlines, suggesting 
that R responses can be made rapidly and automatically (see also 
Konstantinou & Gardiner, in press).  
 The inconsistencies between the above findings and those of the 
present study can be resolved by assuming that RTs to R and K responses do 
not reflect the time-course of the recollection and familiarity processes per se, 
but rather the time taken to make old/new decisions on the basis of the 
information provided by these processes, at least under non-speeded response 
conditions. Henson et al. (1999) suggested that the slower RTs for K 
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responses reflect the time taken to make old/new decisions in the absence of 
contextual information. Similarly, Dewhurst and Conway (1994) argued that 
recognition decisions that do not feature recollective experience require 
additional processing in order to evaluate the familiarity of an item relative to 
other items in the test list. The present findings support these accounts. In 
contrast, when a test item cues contextual details, such as thoughts, images, 
and associations made at encoding, old/new decisions can be made rapidly. 
The faster RTs for R responses therefore reflect the greater ease of making 
such decisions when supported by the recollection of contextual information. 
We would also argue that it is the cueing of this information at test that gives 
rise to the subjective experience of remembering by mentally reinstating 
aspects of the encoding context. Rather than being the product of a slow and 
effortful retrieval process, the present findings indicate that such processes can 
occur rapidly and automatically.  
 The cueing of contextual information at test may also account for the 
faster RTs for R responses to words relative to nonwords observed in 
Experiment 3. This finding is consistent with the view that the encoding of 
words is likely to feature information activated from long-term memory, such 
as images, associations, and autobiographical references. These details are 
cued when the words are presented again at test and support rapid and 
confident experiences of remembering. In contrast, the encoding of nonwords 
is more likely to feature phonological and orthographic information, which 
may be less diagnostic of a prior presentation, resulting in slower recognition 
decisions. To our knowledge, this is the first demonstration of an independent 
variable influencing the speed of R responses.  
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 Some researchers have interpreted R and K responses in terms of 
signal detection theory (e.g., Donaldson, 1996; Dunn, 2004; Hirshman & 
Master, 1997). According to unidimensional signal detection models, 
recognition decisions are based on an underlying dimension of trace strength 
or familiarity. Participants make R/K decisions by setting an old/new criterion 
and a higher remember/know criterion for items judged to be old. Items that 
exceed the second criterion are judged as R responses, while items falling 
between the two criteria as judged as K responses. The present findings are 
not inconsistent with trace strength models, as one would expect highly 
familiar items to be recognized more rapidly than less familiar items. Indeed, 
Wixted and Stretch (2004) have recently shown that a unidimensional signal 
detection model predicts faster RTs for R than for K responses in both hits and 
false alarms. They also argue that such findings cannot be explained by dual-
process remember-know models. However, this argument is based on the 
assumption that R and K responses map directly onto the recollection and 
familiarity processes. As suggested above, it is more likely that R and K 
responses reflect differences in the time taken to make a recognition decision 
based on the information provided by these processes, rather than the speed of 
the processes themselves.  
Although the present findings can be explained by unidimensional 
signal detection models, there is converging evidence from both behavioral 
and brain imaging studies that R and K responses differ in more than just 
familiarity or confidence (see Gardiner & Richardson-Klavehn, 2000, for a 
review). While it is possible that a continuum of trace strength or confidence 
underlies recognition decisions, we have argued that other types of 
information are cued by test items, such as images, associations, and 
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autobiographical references (see also Dewhurst & Conway, 1994; Johnson, 
Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993; Reder et al., 2000). It is this additional 
information that distinguishes R from K responses. The multiattribute nature 
of R responses is more accurately reflected in multidimensional signal 
detection models (e.g., Banks, 2000; Rotello, Macmillan, & Reeder, 2004). 
Such models represent a number of dimensions in a single spatial 
representation, which can then be projected onto unidimensional decision 
axes. However, like unidimensional models, multidimensional signal detection 
models are concerned with modelling the decision process itself rather than 
the subjective experience that accompanies it. Whilst they place constraints on 
the nature and operation of the psychological processes in a model, they are 
not a substitute for psychological explanations of recognition memory. They 
should therefore be seen as complementary to first person accounts, such as 
the remember-know procedure, rather than rival theories.  
 Finally, although not the main focus of the present study, Experiments 
1 and 2 confirmed previous findings of a word frequency mirror effect, 
whereby low-frequency words were associated with more hits and fewer false 
alarms than high-frequency words (e.g., Glanzer & Adams, 1985, 1990). That 
this pattern was observed in three variations of the remember-know procedure 
demonstrates the robust nature of the mirror effect. However, there was no 
evidence of a words-versus-nonwords mirror effect in Experiment 3. Although 
words were associated with more hits than nonwords, false alarms did not 
differ reliably between the two sets of stimuli. This is consistent with the view 
that the higher false alarm rate usually found for high-frequency words reflects 
their greater pre-experimental familiarity relative to low-frequency words 
(e.g., Reder et al., 2000). As nonwords have no pre-existing representations, 
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they cannot be falsely recognized on the basis of pre-experimental familiarity. 
It is also notable that the recognition advantage for low-frequency words was 
always observed in R responses. This is consistent with findings from 
previous research (e.g., Dewhurst et al., 1998; Gardiner & Java, 1990) and 
indicates that the presence of the WFE in R responses is not an artefact of the 
two-step procedure. The presence of the WFE in R responses despite the 
procedural variations also indicates that participants were using R and K 
responses appropriately in the different test conditions. 
 To summarize, the main finding from the present study is that R 
responses are made more rapidly than K responses, regardless of the type of 
remember-know procedure used (one-step or two-step) and of the location of 
the R/K decision within the procedure (immediate or delayed). These findings 
indicate that subjective experiences of remembering and knowing do not map 
directly onto the recollection and familiarity processes, at least as 
conceptualized in dual-process models of recognition memory. Instead, 
experiences of remembering occur rapidly and automatically, while 
experiences of knowing may involve evaluative decisions that require 
conscious control. The present findings are consistent with the view that items 
presented in a test of recognition memory cue different types of information, 
including subjective feelings of familiarity and details of the encoding context. 
It is the type of information available at test (familiarity versus contextual 
details) that determines the speed with which items can be identified as old. 
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Table 1. Mean RTs and mean proportions of correct and false R, K, and G 
responses (with standard errors) in Experiment 1.   
                                                                                                                               
 Remember Know Guess 
                                                                                                                               
Two-step procedure 
Response times 1054 (47) 1242 (60) 1623 (111) 
Hits 
High Frequency .32 (.04) .26 (.03) .11 (.02) 
Low Frequency .45 (.05) .22 (.03) .08 (.02) 
False alarms 
High Frequency .05 (.02)  .14 (.03) .11 (.02) 
Low Frequency .02 (.01) .09 (.02) .06 (.02) 
 
One-step procedure 
Response times 1214 (64) 1710 (94) 2822 (240) 
Hits 
High Frequency .27 (.04) .31 (.04) .07 (.02) 
Low Frequency .42 (.04) .23 (.04) .05 (.02) 
False alarms 
High Frequency .06 (.02) .20 (.03) .10 (.02) 
Low Frequency .04 (.01) .13 (.03) .04 (.01) 
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Table 2. Mean RTs and mean proportions of correct and false R, K, and G 
responses (with standard errors) in Experiment 2.   
                                                                                                                               
 Remember Know Guess 
                                                                                                                               
Response times 796 (20) 930 (61) 1059 (79) 
 
Hits 
High Frequency .33 (.03) .15 (.02) .10 (.02) 
Low Frequency .48 (.03) .13 (.02) .04 (.01) 
 
False alarms 
High Frequency .05 (.01)  .06 (.01) .07 (.01) 
Low Frequency .04 (.01) .04 (.01) .02 (.00) 
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Table 3. Mean RTs and mean proportions of correct and false R, K, and G 
responses (with standard errors) in Experiment 3.   
                                                                                                                               
 Remember Know Guess 
                                                                                                                               
Response times 
Words 1240 (40) 1973 (85) 2435 (175) 
Nonwords 1577 (56) 1964 (83) 2411 (180) 
 
Hits 
Words .51 (.04) .20 (.02) .05 (.01) 
Nonwords .34 (.03) .26 (.03) .07 (.02) 
 
False alarms 
Words .05 (.01)  .12 (.02) .05 (.01) 
Nonwords .06 (.01) .10 (.01) .07 (.02) 
                                                                                                                               
